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AGENCY COORDINATION AND 
OPPORTUNITY ZONES 
Blaine G. Saito* 
The Opportunity Zone (OZ) program, which is designed to 
provide place-based equity investments into certain low-income 
communities, has potential upsides and pitfalls.  The program is 
complicated, and it implicates numerous spheres of policy expertise.  
But currently, it is mostly administered by the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) as a tax program. 
This Essay seeks to find a technical-managerial solution to some of 
the problems of the OZ program, and that is agency coordination.  It 
would have the IRS and the Office of Tax Policy (OTP) work with 
other agencies with expertise in place-based investment programs to 
administer the OZ program.  It outlines the benefits and potential 
problems of coordination and discusses what tools could help improve 
this endeavor.  It also proposes that the coordinated effort attempt to 
engage communities that live in OZs further in guiding the program. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Opportunity Zone (OZ) program, one of the centerpieces of 
the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), is another in a long line of 
place-based tax incentives to improve certain distressed areas in the 
United States.1  And, unlike the TCJA at large, OZs have bipartisan 
provenance and support.  Senator Cory Booker (D-NJ) continues to 
serve as one of the Democrats loudly supporting a major program 
that came into existence under a Republican-supported tax law that 
passed with few Democratic votes.2 
Furthermore, many state governors also appreciate the OZ 
program.  That is because, as structured, they have a great deal of 
latitude in determining what areas qualify for OZs. 
But OZs have also had many problems.  Recent reports have 
shown that many OZs and investments in them are of questionable 
value in reviving neighborhoods.  Some already existing development 
projects have fallen into the OZ provisions’ deferral of gain.  Others 
have noted that many of the communities within OZs have little say 
in the types of development there.  And there is an overall sense that 
the OZ program is, in the end, not really here to help economically 
disadvantaged people, but rather to help the financially well-off grow 
their wealth through limited tax requirements. 
The rest of this issue catalogs these problems and some credible 
solutions regarding OZs.  This short Essay instead focuses on 
something smaller, the question of whether the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS), the primary federal agency involved in administering 
OZs, along with the Office of Tax Policy at the Department of 
Treasury (OTP), are up to this task of managing economic 
development for underserved communities. 
 
 1. See I.R.C. §§ 1400Z-1 to -2. 
 2. Jesse Drucker & Eric Lipton, How a Trump Tax Break to Help Poor 
Communities Became a Windfall for the Rich, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/31/business/tax-opportunity-zones.html 
[https://perma.cc/2P8X-SH84]. 
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The management, administration, and oversight of OZs is beyond 
the IRS’s capacity.  The IRS, as it stands, does not have the requisite 
expertise to implement many desirable changes in the OZ program, 
were they to come to pass.  The IRS does not really have the ability to 
work with states to ensure they are selecting OZs properly or 
providing them with technical support to be cost-effective.  The IRS 
also cannot help in ensuring that community voices are heard.  And 
the IRS may not be able to coordinate across the federal government 
to improve OZs and other community development-related programs 
effectively. 
But the IRS still has an important role to play.  The OZ program 
requires some complex investment entity structures to provide equity 
in development projects and businesses in the OZs.  There are 
significant tax calculations and concepts embedded in the program.  
The IRS also has some visibility regarding other related tax programs 
that seek to revitalize neighborhoods. 
This Essay draws on existing work on tax coordination.  It proposes 
that rather than eliminating the IRS’s role, the federal government 
select the OZ program as a prime candidate for tax coordination 
among the IRS, OTP, and other federal agencies in the community 
development space, such as the Treasury’s Community Development 
and Financial Institutions (CDFI) Fund, the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD), and the Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) to better manage and monitor the program.  Thus, it can 
draw on these agencies’ expertise and help coordinate OZs with other 
programs and other tax expenditures to ensure that OZs work in 
concert and do not run at cross-purposes.  This tax coordination could 
also help improve the lack of community input, as some of these other 
agencies have far better outreach mechanisms. 
The Essay consists of three parts.  Part I provides a brief overview 
of the OZ program and some of its problems.  Particular attention is 
paid to the complex interweaving of tax and non-tax matters within 
the program itself. 
Part II then outlines some of the benefits and pitfalls of agency 
coordination, with a particular focus on OZs.  This Part considers why 
agency coordination makes more sense than moving the program out 
of the IRS’s management. 
Part III develops the way forward on coordination of OZs.  Given 
the complexity of the program itself and the potentially large amounts 
of money involved, it suggests there should be a relatively intensive 
level of coordination.  Part III also discusses some of the most useful 
tools from the agency coordination and tax coordination literature to 
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facilitate coordination between the IRS and other agencies in this 
sphere.  Finally, it also talks about how coordination can help to 
engage and empower citizens on the ground. 
I. SOME OPPORTUNITY ZONE BASICS 
This Part outlines some of the basics of the OZ program and 
highlights some of the problems others have mentioned regarding 
OZs, with a focus on matters that likely rely on the IRS’s expertise 
and matters that fall outside the IRS’s expertise. 
A. Basics of the Program 
The OZ program enacted in the TCJA is different from previous 
place-based community revitalization tax expenditures.  While tax 
incentives like the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC)3 or the Low-
Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC)4 are designed to allow 
leveraging of debt-financing for development projects, OZs seek to 
create opportunities for equity investments and potentially unleash 
new amounts of capital into place-based economic development 
efforts. 
The main tax benefits of an OZ stem from two areas, gain deferral 
and a potential increase in the basis to cover those deferred gains.5  
Generally, there are funds — called Qualified Opportunity Funds 
(QOF) — that pool equity investments from various investors into 
projects in an OZ.6  The investors then get to defer the tax on the gain 
they earned on the QOF investment until the sale or exchange of that 
investment or December 31, 2026, whichever is earlier.7 
Furthermore, the investor in a QOF can increase the basis of their 
QOF investment.  If they hold the QOF investment for at least five 
years, then 10% of the deferred gain is added to the basis.8  If they 
hold it for at least seven years, then 15% of the deferred gain is added 
to the basis.9  And if they hold it for at least ten years, the investor 
can essentially eliminate all gain by electing to change the basis 
 
 3. I.R.C. § 45D. 
 4. Id. § 42. 
 5. Id. § 1400Z-2. 
 6. Id. § 1400Z-2(d). 
 7. Id. § 1400Z-2(b). 
 8. Id. § 1400Z-2(b)(2)(B). 
 9. Id. 
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amount to the fair market value of the QOF investment on the date 
of the sale or exchange.10 
QOFs can invest either in interests in Qualified Opportunity Zones 
(QOZ) Businesses, which earn 50% of their gross income from within 
the QOZ, or in QOZ property, which is tangible property that a QOF 
purchased and uses in a trade or business.11  For QOZ property, the 
property must either have its original use commence with the QOF or 
the QOZ Business using it or be substantially improved by the QOF 
or the QOZ Business.  The property must also have at least 70% of its 
use within the QOZ during 90% of the time the QOF or QOZ 
Business held the property.12 
QOZ are certain census tracts that meet particular requirements as 
low-income areas, similar to the requirements under the NMTC, or a 
census tract contiguous to a low-income area provided that the 
median income there does not exceed 125% of the median family 
income of the adjacent low-income census tract.13  States then select 
no more than 25% of those eligible tracts within the state to be 
QOZ,14 and the Treasury then determines whether they qualify and 
grants the designation. 15 
The OZ program, as envisioned, includes multiple parties.  There 
are investors.16  There are the QOFs, special purpose entities for this 
program.17  There is the federal government.18  There are state 
governments.19  And there are the businesses and communities 
themselves that fall within a QOZ.20  The story sounds like one of 
doing well by doing good, but commentators have started to highlight 
some problems.21 
 
 10. Id. § 1400Z-2(c). 
 11. Id. §§ 1400Z-2(d)(2), (3). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. §§ 1400Z-1(c)(1), (e). 
 14. Id. § 1400Z-1(d)(1). 
 15. Id. § 1400Z-1(b)(1)(B). 
 16. Id. § 1400Z-2(b). 
 17. Id. § 1400Z-2(d)(1). 
 18. See id. § 1400Z-2 (establishing a federal tax law creating the OZs). 
 19. Id. §§ 1400Z-1(b), (d). 
 20. See id. § 1400Z-1(b). 
 21. See, e.g., Edward W. De Barbieri, Opportunism Zones, 39 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 82, 92 (2020) (critiquing OZs along three dimensions of (1) use, noting that 
many OZ business and projects are not useful to the community; (2) transparency, 
observing that OZs have limited reporting requirements; and (3) participation, 
stating that there is almost no public or governmental participation on the projects in 
an OZ); Martin A Sullivan, Opportunity Zone Investment Is Concentrated in Less-
Distressed Zones, 171 TAX NOTES FED. 1871, 1871 (2021) (discussing studies that 
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B. Concerns with OZs 
Others in this Symposium pointed out that OZs have had 
numerous pitfalls.22  This section highlights some of the challenges 
OZs face relevant to this Essay. 
One considerable concern is that many areas that governors chose 
to designate as OZs were areas that already had significant economic 
growth.23  Indeed, some significant projects that used OZ financing 
were already planned prior to the program’s development.24  Many 
OZ projects may thus be inframarginal investments, meaning that 
they would have occurred without the existence of the program.25  If 
the program falls too heavily on such inframarginal effects, it may not 
be economically efficient. 
Additionally, some critics have raised concerns that areas 
designated as OZs are not the areas facing the most significant 
economic challenges.26  The ability to use census tracts adjacent to 
some of the most low-income and distressed areas may mean that 
investment may not occur in the areas with the greatest need.  
Furthermore, even among those census tracts that qualify based on 
their status as low-income tracts, some of these tracts have greater 
needs for investment than others.  The lack of technical 
understanding of those needs and how best to meet them, along with 
potential political pressures, may lead governors to designate OZs 
that do not truly help the most low-income communities.  This 
misguided designation may then further blunt some of the desired 
gains in place-based economic development.  Furthermore, this 
 
highlight these problems with some OZs); Michelle D. Layser, Nonprofit 
Participation in Place-Based Tax Incentive Transactions, 48 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
(forthcoming Oct. 2021); Anika Singh Lemar, An Opportunity Zone Falls in a 
Forest, 48 FORDHAM URB. L.J. (forthcoming Oct. 2021). 
 22. See, e.g., Layser, supra note 21; Lemar, supra note 21. 
 23. Jeff Ernsthausen & Justin Elliott, One Trump Tax Cut Was Meant to Help 




EQF5]; Drucker & Lipton, supra note 2. 
 24. See sources cited supra note 23. 
 25. See, e.g., Ernsthausen & Elliott, supra note 23 (showing an inframarginal 
investment by Under Armour’s Kevin Plank who was already going to make the 
investments regardless of the OZ designation). 
 26. See BRETT THEODOS, BRADY MEIZELL & CARL HEDMAN, URB. INST., DID 
STATES MAXIMIZE THEIR OPPORTUNITY ZONE SELECTIONS? 3 (2018), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/98445/did_states_maximize_their
_opportunity_zone_selections_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/YX3K-LKRQ] (noting that 
many areas designated as OZs already had significant flows of investments). 
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combination of flexibility and lack of technical support in trying to 
find the communities of greatest need and how best to help them with 
an OZ designation increases the concerns of inframarginal 
investments.27 
Further concerns come from the fact that many of the OZ projects 
may not have significant community input or benefits.  It is unclear 
whether there is a significant attempt with projects financed through 
QOFs to solicit input from the members of the community whom they 
serve.  Most of these communities consist of, by definition, low-
income people.28  They live in underinvested communities.  Many are 
Black or of other racial and ethnic minorities.  These groups have 
thus traditionally had lower rates of participation and suffered 
political disempowerment.  OZs may exacerbate these problems 
because of the lack of input that they provide for the community. 
The result could then be that OZ projects may not benefit the 
community.  For example, people in the community may want certain 
businesses to employ people who live in the QOZ in high-paying jobs 
and provide them training.  But a QOZ Business may not employ 
people who live in the OZs in the higher-paying jobs that they 
provide in say, technology.29  Communities may also want people who 
live in the OZ to own and operate QOZ Businesses.  However, given 
that the investment decisions are made without community input, 
there may be few QOZ Businesses that draw on owners and 
operators who come from that area.30  Another related idea is that the 
developments and QOZ Businesses may not provide services to fill 
 
 27. See id. at 2. 
 28. I.R.C §§ 1400Z-1(c)(1), (e). 
 29. See BRETT THEODOS ET AL., URB. INST., AN EARLY ASSESSMENT OF 
OPPORTUNITY ZONES FOR EQUITABLE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS: NINE 
OBSERVATIONS ON THE USE OF THE INCENTIVE TO DATE V–VII (2020), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/102348/early-assessment-of-
opportunity-zones-for-equitable-development-projects.pdf [https://perma.cc/43PG-
QEXV] (noting that few mission- and community-driven investments are occurring, 
great benefits are flowing mainly to wealthy capital holders, and few jobs are created 
within the OZs); De Barbieri, supra note 21, at 87–92 (comparing two projects, one in 
Topeka, Kansas that provides a community benefit and one in Portland, Oregon that 
mainly serves to create high-end office space and luxury apartments); Jim 
Tankersley, A Trump Tax Break Is Not Spurring Job Creation, Study Finds, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/17/business/trump-
opportunity-zone-jobs.html [https://perma.cc/L8C5-4NAN]. 
 30. See sources supra note 29. 
1210 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVIII 
the community need.31  Thus, these concerns over community needs, 
and the specter of gentrification,32 also play a role. 
Finally, if many of the benefits of economic development and 
mobility are not met but OZs do provide a return on investment, the 
program just becomes a way for wealthy individuals and entities to 
receive gains without paying taxes.33  That undermines the overall 
goal of these types of tax expenditures. 
C. The Complexities of OZs 
Beyond those concerns, the program itself is complex.  As the 
diversity of scholarly interests in this issue shows, trying to avoid the 
problems outlined above requires expertise across numerous 
dimensions.34 
The OZ program is a tax program, drawing on intricate issues of 
taxation and a need to follow flows of funds.  The IRS and OTP need 
to administer the key tax aspects of this program, like ensuring the 
basis is properly tracked and gain is either sheltered or captured back.  
OZs also may interact with other tax programs that encourage 
economic development in distressed areas. 
But tracking basis and gains and following the flow of funds is not 
enough.  Ensuring that OZs work requires an understanding of the 
various interplays of policy spheres.  It requires looking at business 
investment.  It requires understanding urban development and land 
use policy in urban areas.  In rural areas, the unique characteristics of 
rural economic development are important as well.  Land use 
questions come into play.  And having some ability to engage with the 
communities that are in OZs is also important to avoid some of these 
problems.35 
 
 31. See Drucker & Lipton, supra note 2 (noting developments for luxury 
buildings and hotels); Ernsthausen & Elliott, supra note 23 (discussing Under 
Armour as the big beneficiary of an OZ in Baltimore, Maryland). 
 32. To be fair, what constitutes gentrification is a debated topic. This Essay 
merely notes that there is this concern with OZs and their operation. 
 33. See generally THEODOS ET AL., supra note 29; Drucker & Lipton, supra note 
2; Ernsthausen & Elliott, supra note 23. 
 34. See Sullivan, supra note 21, at 1876. 
 35. This level of complexity is also revealed in some of the proposed changes to 
OZs mentioned in this issue and by others like researchers at the Urban Institute. 
Should these changes become part of OZs then the pressure and lack of capacity at 
the IRS and OTP would become even greater. See THEODOS ET AL., supra note 29, at 
34–36 (listing recommendations and key benefits to the mission-driven nature of 
investments and the subsequent community effects). 
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Additionally, there are numerous programs that the federal 
government has outside of OZs and outside of the tax laws that 
encourage economic development.36  There should be some 
harmonization across these programs to prevent them from running 
at cross-purposes and thereby frustrating economic development 
goals. 
Furthermore, OZs require some interplay with and monitoring of 
state and local government by the federal government.  That type of 
monitoring also requires some expertise and savvy negotiation skills. 
But the IRS and OTP are not well designed to address these 
concerns on top of the already complicated set of tax concepts within 
the OZ program.  The result then is a program that, even if flawlessly 
designed, might face some of the problems outlined in Part I because 
it is not managed and administered effectively.  Some potential ideas 
for addressing this issue are presented in the next section. 
II. AGENCY COORDINATION FOR OPPORTUNITY ZONES 
Agency coordination is perhaps a useful way to solve some of the 
problems of OZs.  It does not solve problems inherent in the design 
of OZs.  But it does propose a useful means of addressing the 
managerial and administrative concerns and could thus improve OZs 
should the federal government keep and potentially modify the 
program. 
This Part first introduces the concept of coordination and its 
benefits.  The focus is on the OZ program itself.  It then addresses 
some of the concerns around coordination that proper coordination 
design may address. 
A. Agency Coordination and its Benefits 
Agency coordination is the idea that agencies should work together 
to solve certain public problems.37  These types of problems often are 
 
 36. EDA Programs, U.S. ECON. DEV. ADMIN., https://www.eda.gov/programs/eda-
programs/ [https://perma.cc/WR8F-AT2J] (last visited Aug. 31, 2021). 
 37. For some of the key literature on this matter, see generally U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-509, MANAGING FOR RESULTS: OMB IMPROVED 
IMPLEMENTATION OF CROSS-AGENCY PRIORITY GOALS, BUT COULD BE MORE 
TRANSPARENT ABOUT MEASURING PROGRESS (2016) [hereinafter U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-509]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-
220, MANAGING FOR RESULTS: IMPLEMENTATION APPROACHES USED TO ENHANCE 
COLLABORATION IN INTERAGENCY GROUPS (2014); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFF., GAO-12-1022, MANAGING FOR RESULTS: KEY CONSIDERATIONS FOR 
IMPLEMENTING INTERAGENCY COLLABORATIVE MECHANISMS (2012) [hereinafter 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-1022]; EUGENE BARDACH, GETTING 
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highly complicated and overlap the jurisdictions of multiple agencies.  
Agency coordination can take many forms with varied levels of 
intensity. 
One of the major benefits of agency coordination is that it can 
often draw on the expertise of various agencies together.38  Many 
policy problems are complex and require different viewpoints and 
expertise to address them.  Agency coordination provides a means for 
drawing on the vast set of expertise and approaches within the federal 
government to address a problem in a way that produces a better 
solution.  Additionally, having various experts with different 
backgrounds from agencies with varied missions and cultures 
prevents groupthink.  While harmonizing the varied viewpoints could 
be difficult, it ultimately produces better outcomes on policy. 
That need is particularly clear in OZs.  As noted above, OZs are, 
first and foremost, a tax program.  They have huge complexities in 
taxation.  But there is also a great deal of complexity in place-based 
economic development.  Some targets of place-based development 
are in distressed areas in the urban core while others occur in rural 
parts of the country.  These issues could also overlap with questions 
of land use, labor markets, environmental concerns, and housing.  
Addressing sustainable economic development for underserved and 
distressed communities is a daunting task that requires numerous 
expert viewpoints. 
Another benefit is that working together reduces agencies acting at 
cross-purposes and creating conflicting regulatory plans.39  
Frequently, agencies administer more than one program that affects a 
policy sphere.  Agencies also promulgate regulations within a given 
policy sphere.  When you have multiple agencies working in such a 
sphere, cross-purpose policies can arise where the administration of 
some programs and regulations undermine other programs and 
regulations.  That can lead to problems in trying to obey regulatory 
 
AGENCIES TO WORK TOGETHER: THE PRACTICE AND THEORY OF MANAGERIAL 
CRAFTSMANSHIP (1998); Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared 
Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2012); Jason Marisam, Interagency 
Administration, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183 (2013); Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 
COLUM. L. REV. 211 (2015); Blaine G. Saito, Tax Coordination, 38 GA. ST. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2022) [hereinafter Saito, Tax Coordination]. 
 38. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-1022, supra note 37, at 9–10, 
13–14; Freeman & Rossi, supra note 37, at 1171–72, 1184–85; Marisam, supra note 37, 
at 184–85; Renan, supra note 37, at 213; Saito, Tax Coordination, supra note 37, at 
15–17. 
 39. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 37, at 1150–51; Saito, Tax Coordination, 
supra note 37, at 17–18. 
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commands or unnecessary tradeoffs between various federal 
programs. 
Here, OZs can harness the benefits of agency coordination to avoid 
cross-purpose federal programs.  Many agencies outside of the IRS 
and OTP have some stake in this matter.  Any agency involved in 
place-based economic development programs would ideally work 
together with the IRS and OTP to have these programs reinforce one 
another.  Further, it is important that the regulations for these 
programs work in harmony. 
Agency coordination can work well in allowing for resource 
efficiency.40  Traditionally, writers who talk about overlapping agency 
jurisdictions in a policy sphere talk about the benefits of redundancy 
— that is creating similar capacities in multiple agencies.  But 
redundancy is expensive.  In fact, in the tax sphere, the IRS and OTP 
often build redundancies not to help mitigate the probability of 
regulatory failure in some broad policy sphere but instead to make 
sure they can administer the tax code itself. 
With OZs, given that it is such a large and complex tax program, 
having the IRS and OTP go it alone would mean massive resource 
and staffing commitments.  Unfortunately, the IRS and OTP have, in 
recent years, seen significant cuts in funding.41  Even if pledges that 
President Biden and Congressional Democrats have made to increase 
IRS funding go forward, most of those will likely go to areas that 
were starved of funds, like auditing wealthy people.42  The lack of 
resources then means that it is unlikely that the IRS will invest in 
program management aspects of the OZ program like collecting and 
sharing smart practices to encourage meeting the greatest needs of 
communities to states, localities, and private actors.  Furthermore, it 
is similarly foolhardy to expect other agencies to use resources to 
develop the necessary expertise in tax accounting and the interactions 
 
 40. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 37, at 1182–84; see also Marisam, supra note 37, 
at 190; Saito, Tax Coordination, supra note 37, at 18–19. 
 41. See, e.g., Yeganeh Torbati, Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal Could Make It 
Harder for Tax Cheats to Elude IRS, WASH. POST (June 28, 2021, 2:45 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/06/26/irs-enforcement-infrastructure/ 
[https://perma.cc/MBU3-CYG7] (discussing a new bill that would increase IRS 
funding after decades of budget cuts). 
 42. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Investing in the IRS and Improving 
Tax Compliance (Apr. 28, 2021), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-
releases/jy0150 [https://perma.cc/GGZ9-KLWM]; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t 
of the Treasury, Statement by Secretary Yellen on the President’s FY22 
Discretionary Funding Request (Apr. 9, 2021), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-
releases/jy0117 [https://perma.cc/4JDH-FRQ8]. 
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of OZs with other parts of the tax law.  Thus, here too, coordination 
could provide a major benefit to the OZ program. 
Coordination can also help limit agency capture.43  A single agency 
administering a program is often captured by interest groups that 
work with that agency frequently.  When another agency joins forces 
with the agency involved in the program, that same interest often 
does not have the same influence over this new agency as it may have 
had over the first agency involved.  To capture effectively, that 
interest group will need to capture both agencies, not just the first 
agency with which it had a relationship.44  Furthermore, different 
agencies often have capture risk by different sets of interest groups.45 
Agency coordination with another agency can also allow agencies to 
play interference.  For example, where two separate interest groups 
each seek to capture separate agencies, by coordinating, the agencies 
can play the interests groups off of each other.  This can provide the 
two agencies greater space and freedom to implement policy and 
manage programs. 
With OZs, different agencies also have different interest groups 
that are more likely to capture them.  The IRS and OTP are most 
likely captured by sophisticated taxpayers, like financial interests that 
operate QOFs.  But other agencies, like HUD are more likely 
captured by interests related to the direct development of OZs.  
Having more than the IRS and OTP running the OZ program should 
reduce capture and allow the IRS, OTP, and a coordinating agency to 
play those interests off each other.  For example, developers and 
QOF managers may not have identical goals.  Recognizing those 
divergent interests, the IRS and OTP working, say, with HUD could 
exploit those differences to create greater room for them to manage 
the program better or even seek out other voices. 
Finally, and quite important given some of the problems 
surrounding OZs, different agencies often have different 
constituencies and dissimilar ways to access members of the public.  
Indeed, while other agencies may not be perfect, the IRS and OTP 
are perhaps the least likely of the agencies at the federal level to 
engage effectively with the needs of community members directly 
affected by OZ projects.  Coordination in this area, then, provides a 
 
 43. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 37, at 1186–87; Saito, Tax Coordination, supra 
note 37, at 19. 
 44. See sources cited supra note 43. 
 45. See sources cited supra note 43. 
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more effective means to reach out to these people and allow their 
voices to provide input. 
B. Coordination Pitfalls 
Coordination is not magical, and it is often not easy.  There are 
some common pitfalls regarding coordination.  But the appropriate 
tools can address these pitfalls. 
The first concern is that there could be indeterminacy, turf fights, 
or other forms of unproductive conflict.  Indeterminacy arises when 
agencies for some reason or another, usually because of some conflict, 
cannot reach a resolution on the policy.46  Turf fights occur when an 
agency tries to overclaim within a policy space to exclude other 
actors.47  These forms of conflict arise sometimes from agencies 
aggrandizing themselves or agencies that have major viewpoint 
differences and are unwilling to compromise on those differences.  
Conflicts like these can also arise when agencies and their employees 
do not understand the other agency and its culture.  A sense of 
unfamiliarity and a lack of trust can lead to these forms of 
unproductive conflict.48 
Another problem is, the opposite of indeterminacy and turf wars, 
the loss of all conflict.49  Conflict and competition among agencies can 
sometimes be productive leading agencies to race to implement 
programs better and faster than others.  Ironically, the loss of conflict 
leads to the very groupthink that agency coordination seeks to 
avoid.50  Here, the differences in culture and agency goals can help 
avoid this loss.  If agencies in the coordination effort have different 
goals and outlooks, the risk of this problem is greatly reduced. 
Successful agency coordination then requires threading the needle 
between these two poles by using the various tools described below. 
In the case of OZs, the larger concerns resulting from 
indeterminacy stem less from confrontation but more from a sense of 
 
 46. See Marisam, supra note 37, at 210. 
 47. BARDACH, supra note 37, at 178–80; Marisam, supra note 37, at 210–12; Saito, 
Tax Coordination, supra note 37, at 20–21. 
 48. See sources cited supra note 47. 
 49. See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agencies as Adversaries, 
105 CALIF. L. REV. 1375, 1384–85 (2017) (noting that conflict can often be beneficial); 
Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 
2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 212–14 (2006); Saito, Tax Coordination, supra note 37, at 20–
23. 
 50. See Farber & O’Connell, supra note 49, at 1422; see also Gersen, supra note 
49; Saito, Tax Coordination, supra note 37, at 21–23. 
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neglect and inexperience in working together.51  The IRS and OTP 
are not known for working with other agencies to implement, 
administer, and manage tax programs that have other policy effects 
well.52  The lack of experience of working with others and the intrinsic 
complexity of working in the tax area can lead to misunderstanding of 
other agencies’ cultures by the IRS and OTP, and vice versa.53  That 
leads to a lack of trust and raises the risk that when the agencies work 
together, they may not answer key questions or undertake important 
actions.  This indeterminacy means that people are then left in a 
lurch.54  It also provides an opportunity for actors to use the program 
in ways that Congress and others did not intend by increasing private 
gains and reducing the communal economic gains. 
C. Coordination Versus Reorganization 
Given the challenges of coordination and the pitfalls noted above, 
some may argue that the best solution would be to reorganize the 
matter and remove the program from the IRS and OTP.  That call 
though may not work well with OZs. 
First, the OZ program relies heavily on tax concepts and is 
embedded within the tax laws.  Changes to the program could affect 
other parts of the tax law.  To ensure that the tax laws somewhat 
cohere, the IRS’s and OTP’s involvement is important.  Additionally, 
changes in the tax law could affect the OZ program itself.  
Understanding those effects is also important to managing the 
program and its incentives.  But to understand those effects, one 
needs to have an overall understanding of the tax laws.  Thus, having 
the IRS and OTP involved to handle these issues and to provide tax 
expertise is important. 
Second, the OZ program also involves monitoring finances and 
QOF.  The IRS is traditionally good at this type of monitoring and 
enforcement.  Keeping the IRS involved then allows the OZ program 
to rely on and leverage this expertise. 
Third, the IRS and OTP have an overview of the entire Code and 
Treasury Regulations and could find areas of overlap between these 
programs and other tax programs for place-based economic 
development.  They are in the best position to ensure these tax place-
 
 51. See Saito, Tax Coordination, supra note 37, at 20–21. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
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based economic devolvement programs within the Code work well 
together. 
Fourth, reorganization itself is also not costless.  Many of the 
pitfalls of duplication one seeks to avoid by having the IRS and OTP 
solely in charge of OZs would be replicated if another agency were 
solely administering the program.  Furthermore, reorganizations do 
not always go smoothly. 
Thus, coordination seems to be the best route to address the 
program.  The means to prevent some of the problems of agency 
coordination among the IRS, OTP, and other federal agencies is to 
structure the agency coordination in an intentional way.  That 
involves using both structural and managerial tools to ensure that 
coordination for the OZ program works well.  The next section 
addresses these coordination tools and how to use them within the 
OZ program. 
III. STRUCTURING OZ AGENCY COORDINATION 
Avoiding the pitfalls of coordination and seeking the highest level 
of gain requires a proper structuring of agency coordination and the 
use of the proper tools. 
Given that this program affects numerous policy spheres and has a 
great deal of complexity both in tax and non-tax areas, using several 
coordination tools in combination is likely important.   
Success in coordination is not guaranteed.  Working together 
across agency lines is hard.  But without coordination, it is unlikely 
that the OZ program will work effectively.  Below are some of the 
tools to aid in successful coordination. 
This section first examines what agencies should be involved in the 
coordination.  It then discusses how the centralized power of the 
Executive Office of the President, mainly the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) and OMB’s subagency, the Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), can assist.  It then delves down to 
tools and actions that the IRS and OTP can use to assist in the 
coordination effort.  It closes by examining how the coordination 
effort may increase community involvement in OZs. 
A. Agencies Involved 
An essential first step is determining which agencies should 
participate in a coordination effort for managing OZs going forward. 
Three other agencies come to mind for working in tandem with the 
IRS and OTP in administering OZs.  The first is HUD.  As the lead 
agency for rental housing in the United States, HUD administers 
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numerous programs for place-based economic development outside 
of the rental housing sphere.55  HUD could work to use OZs to 
leverage other important programs for revitalizing distressed areas 
like Community Development Block Grants (CDBGs).56 
A second agency is USDA.  The USDA does economic 
development focused on agriculture and rural areas.  It has a 
preexisting working relationship with HUD as well as working on 
rental housing matters in rural areas.57  The USDA also has contact 
with members of rural communities who often benefit from its 
programs.58 
Finally, a third agency to consider is a subagency of the Treasury, 
the CDFI Fund.  Along with the IRS and OTP, the CDFI Fund 
administers a sister program to OZs, the NMTC.59  While OZs seek to 
attract equity capital, the NMTC attracts debt financing for place-
based community economic development.60  The strong overlaps 
between these programs’ purposes and the existing strong 
relationship among the IRS, OTP and the CDFI Fund also support 
working together.61 
Additionally, all three agencies have contacts and can work both 
with and push back against state and local entities.  These agencies 
have experience not only enforcing rules against state and localities, 
but also monitoring them for what works well and serving as a source 
of support for interested states and localities looking to tailor certain 
smart practices.  Such information is also useful to determine what 
changes need to be made to the OZ statute and regulations to help it 
evolve into a more effective program. 
After identifying the agencies, the next question that arises is which 
agency should take the lead.  At this point, since the IRS and OTP 
 
 55. See Blaine G. Saito, Collaborative Governance and the Low-Income Housing 
Tax Credit, 39 VA. TAX REV. 451, 484–85 (2020) [hereinafter Saito, Collaborative 
Governance]; Programs of HUD, U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URB. DEV., 
https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/Main/documents/HUDPrograms2020.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/87FH-YGFC]. 
 56. See Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 
88 Stat. 633. 
 57. Rural Housing Service, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., https://www.rd.usda.gov/about-
rd/agencies/rural-housing-service [https://perma.cc/8WWE-ZEKT] (last visited Aug. 
11, 2021). 
 58. Id. 
 59. About Us, CMTY. DEV. FIN. INST. FUND, https://www.cdfifund.gov/about 
[https://perma.cc/FNU2-H2ZB] (last visited Aug. 12, 2021). 
 60. Id. 
 61. See THEODOS ET AL., supra note 29, at VII (calling for more OZ investment in 
CDFIs). 
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have already taken significant steps in implementing OZs through 
regulations and publicizing them to investors in QOFs, it makes some 
sense to leave leadership of the program there for now.62  But at some 
point, another agency could take the lead as the program develops 
and changes. 
B. Coordination from OMB and OIRA 
The OZ program has bipartisan backing from Congress, and is also 
a policy that even the Biden Administration wants to continue.63  
Given this political support, coordination efforts for OZs can call on 
the OMB and the OIRA.64 
OMB can help in a few ways.  First, it has some understanding of 
other coordination efforts within the federal government.65  It serves 
as a potential storehouse for smart practices from the agencies 
involved in OZ coordination.66 
OMB can also help in ensuring that the agencies receive resources 
to implement effective coordination.67  That means ensuring that 
there is some budget authority to use many of the coordination tools 
and holding the agencies to account here.68 
OIRA, as a subagency of OMB, can also help coordinate.  While 
previously excluded from OIRA review, tax regulations, including 
those for OZs, now must go through the OIRA review process if they 
are considered economically significant.69  Using this process can 
ensure that all agencies involved in the coordination effort on OZs 
get a proper say in the regulation process. 
More importantly, OIRA’s review of previous regulations also 
allows it to introduce the IRS and OTP to other agencies that may be 
interested in the OZ program going forward.70  For the three agencies 
 
 62. See Saito, Collaborative Governance, supra note 55, at 496 (noting that if 
coordination were to occur under the LIHTC, given its central role in operating the 
program and its enforcement powers, retaining IRS leadership would make sense). 
 63. See Sullivan, supra note 21, at 1876–77. 
 64. See Saito, Tax Coordination, supra note 37, at 54–56. 
 65. See id. 
 66. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-509, supra note 37, at 23–25, 
28–30; Saito, Tax Coordination, supra note 37, at 55–56. 
 67. Saito, Tax Coordination, supra note 37, at 56. 
 68. See id. 
 69. See id. at 54–55; see also Clinton G. Wallace, Centralized Review of Tax 
Regulations, 70 ALA. L. REV. 455, 478–82 (2018). 
 70. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: 
Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1840–43 (2013); Saito, Tax 
Coordination, supra note 37, at 54–55. 
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mentioned above as primary agencies to work with the IRS and OTP 
in the OZ program, OIRA review of newer regulations can serve as 
an initial point of contact.  In doing so, intra-agency discussions can 
occur, which, in turn, can build trust among agency personnel.  
Furthermore, OIRA review and OIRA’s involvement can also help 
facilitate other agencies outside those mentioned above that may 
have something to add to the OZ program’s participation.  For 
example, if more information is required regarding labor markets and 
job training, perhaps OIRA can invite the Department of Labor to 
comment on any proposed regulations to OZs. 
Finally, OIRA and OMB can also assist the IRS and OTP and the 
coordinating agencies to develop and use the managerial coordination 
tools mentioned below.  OIRA and OMB, by sitting in the Executive 
Office of the United States President and overseeing the entire 
executive branch,71 can determine the smart practices in other agency 
coordination efforts and see if some of those can be adapted to the 
OZ program.72  They can also serve as facilitators for negotiations.  
They can also continue to monitor the coordination and push the 
agencies to update their practices should the needs of the programs or 
the agencies change. 
Thus, having some of this effort come from the top can help.  But 
the lion’s share of coordination work must come from the IRS and 
OTP itself.  Below are some of the key tools that they should use in 
implementing coordination. 
C. Managerial Coordination Tools 
One of the most important ways to make coordination succeed is to 
employ managerial tools to make it work.  Section C describes these 
tools. 
i. Memorandum of Understanding 
The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is perhaps the most 
venerable and well-known of the coordination tools.73  MOUs are 
agreements between agencies in a coordination effort.  They outline 
the roles, rights, and responsibilities of each of the actors.  Even 
 
 71. See Saito, Tax Coordination, supra note 37, at 51, 54–56. 
 72. See id. 
 73. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-1022, supra note 37, at 25–26; 
see also Freeman & Rossi, supra note 37, at 1161–65; Saito, Tax Coordination, supra 
note 37, at 63–64. 
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though they are not legally binding,74 agencies often act as if MOUs 
have some force behind them.75 
The process of developing an MOU in the OZ context requires 
that the agencies outline the key program management, policy, and 
regulatory concerns with OZs.  The MOU development process 
should then have the agencies engage in a discussion of the resources 
and expertise they can bring to the OZ program.  The MOU should 
also outline how the agencies will engage with all the parties in the 
OZs, including key community voices.  In short, the process of 
developing the MOU should help the parties work through their 
concerns and understandings of the program and their coordination. 
On some of the details of what the MOU should contain, it should 
parcel responsibilities based on the agencies’ expertise.  In terms of 
trying to ensure that finances are in order and to maintain 
compliance, the IRS and OTP should be involved.  But most of the 
programmatic responsibilities should fall in the hands of the non-tax 
agencies.  These responsibilities include determining what types of 
projects are best at revitalizing distressed areas, engaging local 
communities to help assess their needs, and investigating whether OZ 
investments actually meet those needs. 
The MOU should also outline the interaction of OZs and other 
place-based economic development programs.  Indeed, it may help 
the same sets of agencies coordinate with the IRS and OTP on other 
place-based economic tax credits.  These programs include but are 
not limited to the NMTC and LIHTC.  Furthermore, it may also 
make sense to consider the managerial interactions between OZs and 
actual outlay programs like CDBGs.  The goal is to have these 
programs work as harmoniously together as possible. 
Finally, the MOU should also help outline how some of these other 
coordination tools below should work.  It can provide the overall 
structure to ensure the other tools are successful in facilitating 
coordination.  The MOU should also outline what resources need to 
come to bear on managing the OZ program. 
ii. Information Sharing 
Another vital part of successful coordination is sharing necessary 
information among the agencies as they work together.76  A failure to 
 
 74. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 37, at 1165. 
 75. See id. at 1161–63 (finding that agencies sign MOUs for “a variety of 
purposes” and use these documents to outline clear goals among agencies). 
 76. Saito, Tax Coordination, supra note 37, at 64–66. 
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share information between the IRS and OTP and the other 
coordinating agency will lead to a failure in the effort. 
For OZs, there are significant pieces of information that all the 
agencies involved need to know.  Agencies should know what 
projects and QOZ Businesses that QOFs are funding.  They should 
know what effect these investments have on the underlying 
community in an OZ.  All agencies should also have access to some 
information as to what drives OZ investments and to see if 
investments in OZs also draw upon other tax and non-tax economic 
development programs. 
But not all agencies involved in the coordinated management of 
the OZ program need to know everything that the IRS needs to 
administer the tax benefits.  Most importantly, other agencies do not 
need to know the identities of investors in QOFs and the amount of 
deferred or forgone taxes on gains that each investor receives from a 
QOF investment.  It is only the IRS that needs that information.  
Although, aggregate information here would be helpful for the 
coordinating agencies to manage the program. 
To that end, then, the agencies should determine together how to 
structure the exchange of large amounts of important information 
regarding OZs and the various investments made while still 
protecting some level of taxpayer privacy. 
Some of these moves in the OZ program right now not only 
require sharing of information but collection.  Others have pointed 
out that now, under the current law, the IRS is collecting little 
information on OZs and their projects.77  Most of the information for 
how much is invested in OZs comes from third-party sources. 
That problem, though, gives Congress and others an opportunity to 
think intentionally about the information sharing regime for OZs.  
Traditionally, the IRS is prohibited from disclosing tax return 
information under I.R.C. § 6103.  Furthermore, most coordination 
efforts do not meet the tax administration exception under I.R.C. § 
6103(h).78 
A useful way around this issue is to have more of the information 
other than the identities of QOF investors run through the partner 
agencies.79  That information can, if needed for the tax benefits, then 
 
 77. De Barbieri, supra note 21, at 148–53 (noting the lack of annual reporting 
requirements and reporting for the selection of OZs). 
 78. See I.R.C. §§ 6103(j)(1)–(3), (5)–(6), (k), (l), (o); see also Saito, Tax 
Coordination, supra note 37, at 64–66. 
 79. See Saito, Tax Coordination, supra note 37, at 64–66. 
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be attached to the return of someone claiming the OZ tax benefits 
and to the QOF’s return.  That approach turns much of the 
information that all the agencies need into tax return information 
under I.R.C. § 6103. 
iii. Line-Level Teams and Line-Level Outreach 
Perhaps one of the most useful tools for coordination among the 
IRS and OTP and other agencies like HUD, USDA, and the CDFI 
Fund is creating joint teams of line-level employees. Line-level 
employees are civil servants who run the day-to-day operations of an 
agency like revenue agents, to help manage and monitor the OZ 
program.80 
Often many of the different aspects of the OZ program interact in 
unusual ways.  Trying to get a sense as to what is working best to spur 
the largest amount of growth in a way that the community in an OZ 
requires, as noted, different levels of expertise.  Having line-level 
teams with people who have those different types of expertise allows 
the agencies to work together in a way that most immediately affects 
parties outside the federal government. 
Line-level teams, of course, can monitor compliance and take note 
of things that fall outside the stated goals of the OZ program, even if 
they are technically correct.81  They can work together to ensure that, 
for example, QOZ Businesses are earning the required amount of 
gross income in the OZ.  But they can also examine if the QOZ 
Business is employing more people from within the OZ or providing 
needed benefits to the area.  They can also see if a development of 
QOZ property leverages other programs and how it does that 
effectively to create growth that is beneficial to the community.  Thus, 
these line-level teams are not just there to enforce the program’s 
rules, but they are also there to see what works and to see whether 
the program itself is meeting some of its stated goals. 
Line-level teams can also look at how states have implemented the 
OZ program and how they decided what to designate as OZs.82  
While there is nothing preventing a state from choosing qualified 
areas as OZs, gathering the information as to what are the 
 
 80. See BARDACH, supra note 37, at 117–19; Saito, Tax Coordination, supra note 
37, at 59–61. 
 81. See Saito, Tax Coordination, supra note 37, at 58–61 (discussing the benefits 
of line-level teams, which can better aid in administration and management). 
 82. See id. (arguing that line-level teams can help create a formal structure in the 
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characteristics where investment in an OZ has the greatest effect and 
has actual marginal effects is information that can then be shared with 
other states, should the program continue with a new round of 
designations. 
Furthermore, these joint teams, because they have connections to 
other related economic development programs, can provide some 
means for non-federal government actors to work to leverage 
multiple programs together.  Many of these place-based economic 
development programs, like OZs, NMTC, Low-Income Housing Tax 
Credits, and CDBGs, can together create synergistic effects to 
improve these areas. 
These types of line-level teams can also serve as the eyes and ears 
of the agencies involved in coordination to members of the 
community.83  They are the people who, working together, can engage 
the community in some of the listening sessions discussed below.  
Additionally, they are also ones that can reach out and get feedback 
from community organizations and nonprofits that work within a 
particular OZ to see how these OZs work.  Many of the proposed 
reforms in this issue could thus leverage the mixed expertise of these 
line-level teams. 
Finally, within the agencies themselves, having these mixed line-
level teams helps all the agencies to understand other agencies’ 
language and culture better.84  They can also begin to create their own 
joint set of terms to discuss things.  They can turn to their teammate 
immediately if they have a question about a matter that falls outside 
their expertise.  They can serve as a source of trust-building.  This can 
then improve the work that they do in this program. 
D. Improving Community Input 
Finally, while not entirely a tool of coordination, the coordination 
effort should seek to improve community input.  This will allow the 
effort to potentially gain another base of support and help build 
internal support for coordination by providing a useful mission focus.  
It can create a view among the agencies that this program and their 
work is to serve these communities.  Such a strong mission sense can 
help bind together some of the joint line-level teams and others who 
work on this program. 
Additionally, this type of engagement draws on agencies outside of 
the IRS and OTP, thereby allowing the tax agencies to understand 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
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the importance of working with others.  As noted, three of the most 
likely candidates to work together on OZs — HUD, USDA, and the 
CDFI Fund — have public-facing engagement.  Furthermore, a joint 
team that reaches out through one of these other agencies would 
likely not strike fear into the hearts of community members.  
Generally, many people when they hear from the IRS, tend to think 
they will be audited. 
Of course, even with these connections, more community 
engagement and input are desirable to allow these communities to 
receive what they need and to have ownership over these programs.  
To that end, there are two approaches that could help. 
First is to create listening sessions made up of relatively large 
groups of randomly selected community members affected by an OZ 
to talk to some agency line officials working on a joint team.  While 
such participation is voluntary, it will be encouraged as a means for 
them to shape their community’s future.  Gathering input from a 
broad cross-section of people prevents overweighting the perspectives 
of only those who opt in.  Those who typically do opt in, after all, tend 
to be more connected and more politically involved. 
Second, especially since many of the people involved here are 
lower-wealth and lower-income, they should receive some 
compensation for their time.  Such a move makes it more likely that 
someone will say yes when offered the random lot opportunity to 
participate in a community discussion. 
While many may consider this matter a bit beyond what ordinary 
citizens can do, some work has been done in some jurisdictions with 
participatory budgeting.  There has been some success in having 
citizens determine projects aided by teams of experts to provide 
input.  The community engagement envisioned here then builds on 
some of these successes.85 
Of course, many would argue that paying people is expensive.  But 
if the program only has inframarginal effects and does not have a 
strong benefit to those living in those communities, the costs are 
greater.  The result of choosing not to pay for such engagement may 
thus be pennywise and pound-foolish. 
In the end, such a move not only strengthens agency coordination 
through greater mission focus and seeing the results and the effect of 
OZs on communities, but it also creates the opportunity to hear from 
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individuals whose voices are too often ignored.  In working with this 
program, this is a laudable goal. 
CONCLUSION 
Agency coordination is a managerial method consisting of various 
tools that can help improve the administration and the operation of 
the OZ programs.  Doing so would allow better analysis and program 
management, stronger connections with other related programs, and 
improved relationships between the federal government and 
communities.  Indeed, given the fact that it touches so many different 
policy spheres, OZs are ripe for coordination. 
While difficult, such work is attainable through the proper use of 
managerial tools.  Bringing together the agencies of the IRS and 
OTP, HUD, USDA, the CDFI Fund, and potentially others to work 
together will help to build a system of coordination. 
Agency coordination for OZs could help make some marginal 
improvements to the program.  But more importantly, agency 
coordination can help policymakers and others who want to improve 
the OZ program find effective ways to make these changes and 
improvements.  Agency coordination also provides a platform and 
framework upon which any policy changes can build on the growing 
relationships between the tax agencies of the IRS and OTP and other 
agencies.  This strengthened relationship should create long-lasting 
enhancements to the monitoring, management, administration, and 
enforcement of the OZ program.  Hopefully, as time goes on, 
coordination will continue to spur further coordination and 
innovation and the fruits of coordination can be reflected in revisions 
and changes in the OZ program itself. 
 
